Columbia Law Rev. 336, but an injunction to prevent threatened shadowing in a similar case was denied in *Chappell* v. *Stewart* (1896) 82 Md. 323. Mere annoyance as such is not a nuisance and is not a ground for equitable relief. So, where an injunction was granted against annoying music in adjacent premises, it was on the ground that the plaintiff was injured in the enjoyment of his property. *Motion* v. *Mills* (1897) 12 L. T. R. 246. If the acts of the defendant can be construed to be wilful or so plainly calculated to produce physical harm that an intent to do so will be imputed, then the plaintiff can recover for her injury in an action at law, *Wilkinson* v. *Downton* (1897) 2 Q. B. 57, and, if they should be continued after a judgment was obtained by the plaintiff at law, perhaps equity's aid could then be invoked to prevent a multiplicity of suits. However, it is submitted that if in the interest of free speech equity refrains from exercising jurisdiction to enjoin the publication of a threatened libel, *Finnish Temperance Society etc.* v. *Raivaaja Public Co.* (1914) 219 Mass. 28, 106 N. E. 561, then, a similar result should be reached in the case of persistent undesired correspondence where the plaintiff's hurt is comparatively less.

INTERNATIONAL LAW—REQUISITIONED SHIP—IMMUNITY FROM PROCESS.—The British steamship *Roseric* collided with the libellant's barge in a New York harbor. The vessel, although still in charge of the owners' officers and crew, had been requisitioned by the British Admiralty and was under its control as a government transport. *Held,* all proceedings against the *Roseric* should be stayed while it continued in the government service. *The Roseric* (D. C. 1918) 254 Fed. 154.

The general rule of international law is that foreign warships are exempt from local jurisdiction. 2 Moore, Digest § 254; *The Schooner Exchange* v. *McFadden* (1812) 11 U. S. 116; *The Constitution* (1879) 4 P. D. 39. This rule has been extended to other public vessels, *The Parlement Belge* (1880) 5 P. D. 197, and to other property of a sovereign. *Vavasseur* v. *Krupp* (1878) 9 Ch. D. 351. The reason for the rule is that the public ship is an instrumentality of sovereignty and any interference with it impairs the dignity and independence of the foreign state. 2 Moore, *op. cit.* § 258. The same principle underlies the immunity of the head of the state, *Mighell* v. *Sultan of Johore* (L. R. 1893) 1 Q. B. 149, his armed forces, Wheaton, International Law (5th Eng. ed.) 152, 155, and his diplomatic agents. Hall, International Law (5th ed.) 172. Two preliminary questions necessarily arise in determining the right to immunity in a particular case: (1) Is the party claiming it a sovereign state? This is wholly a political question dependent upon the doctrine of recognition and is settled by the statement of the local foreign office. See *The Gagara* (Ct. of App. 1919) Lloyd's List Feb. 17, 1919, p. 4; *The Annette & The Dora* (H. C. J. Adm. Div. 1919) Lloyd's List March 1, 1919, p. 11. (2) Is the vessel public in character? The declaration of the sovereign or the commission of the ship are conclusive answers to this question, since any investigation by the court into the character of the vessel would involve *per se* a departure from the rule of exemption. Hall, *op. cit.* 162; see *The Parlement Belge, supra,* 219. Two tests of immunity have been applied: (1) public use, see *Briggs* v. *The Light Boats* (1865) 11 Allen 157; *The Maipo* (D. C. 1918) 252 Fed. 627; (2) possession, *The Attualita* (C. C. A. 1916) 238 Fed. 909; *Johnson Lighter-*

age Co., No. 24 (D. C. 1916) 231 Fed. 365. The latter is confined to the American courts, but see *The Annette & The Dora, supra,* and is an outgrowth of the rule that United States Government property is not exempt from process unless in the actual possession of its officers. See *The Davis* (1869) 77 U. S. 15. But, although this rule rests upon a different basis from the immunity of foreign governments, see *The Davis, supra;* the court in *Long* v. *The Tampico* (D. C. 1883) 16 Fed. 491 extended it to the latter. Down to *The Attualita, supra,* all the cases were decided upon the ground that the property had not been delivered to the foreign government and in no case had it yet come into public use. But *The Attualita, supra,* squarely held actual possession necessary irrespective of public use. Since a vessel engaged in public service, though not in actual possession of the government agent, is no less an instrumentality of sovereignty, the doctrine of *The Attualita, supra,* seems unsound, see *The Errisos* (H. C. J. Adm. Div. 1917) Lloyd's List, Oct. 24, 1917, p. 5-8; *The Messicano* (1916) 32 L. T. R. 519; *The Broadmayne* (C. C. A. 1916) 64, 70; *The Luigi* (D. C. 1916) 230 Fed. 493, and the principal case, in repudiating it and applying the test of a public use, seems more in accord with the reason for the immunity and is a return to better established principles of international law. *Cf.* 2 Moore, *op. cit.* § 258.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS—ALIEN ENEMY—DISABILITY.—The plaintiff, a German bank, was the endorsee of demand promissory notes drawn by defendants before the war. From the declaration of war until the government granted a license, the plaintiff was unable to bring suit. *Held,* the Limitation Act bars recovery. Once the time has begun to run under the Act, no subsequent disability to sue stops it. *Deutsche Asiatesche Bank* v. *Hira Lall Burdham & Sons* (1918) XXIII Calcutta Weekly Notes 157.

The sovereign's right to confiscate the debts of alien enemies during war was so frequently exercised down to the year 1737, 1 Kent, Comm. (14th ed.) § 62, that the question of providing for payment upon the restoration of peace did not arise. After that time it does not appear to have been decided in England, except by way of dictum, that a limitation act runs against an alien enemy during a period of disability. See *De Wahl* v. *Braun* (1856) 25 L. J. C. L. 343; Page, War & Alien Enemies (2nd ed.) 84, and this dictum has been criticized. Chadwick, Foreign Investments in War, 20 Law Quar. Rev. 167. The American courts have construed limitation acts broadly in favor of disabled suitors so as to allow the time of disability to be deducted from the period limited for the commencement of the action, *United States* v. *Wiley* (1870) 78 U. S. 508; notwithstanding the acts made no provision for the contingency of war, and although the disability did not exist when the cause of action accrued. *Hanger* v. *Abbott* (1867) 73 U. S. 522; *Wall* v. *Robson* (S. C. 1820) 2 Nott. & M. *98; *contra, Winn's Succession* (1881) La. Ann. 1392. The acts of many American jurisdictions provide that the time of continuance of war after the cause of action accrues shall be excluded in determining the period limited for the commencement of actions when the right of action and the disability coexist. N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 404, 408; *cf.* Mass. Rev. Laws, 1902, c. 202, § 8; Huberich, Trading with the Enemy 317-20. But, in the instant case, the plaintiff's right of action on the demand note preceded his disability, Wood, Limitations (3rd ed.) § 124, and, by the Limita-